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1 Introduction
International migration is the ”great absentee” (Faini, DeMelo, and Zim-
mermann, 1999) in the current globalisation wave. Net emigration rates in
the developing countries number no more than 0.1 per cent of their pop-
ulations p.a., although the GDP per capita in these countries is less than
one-tenth of that in the developed world (World Bank, 2005). Even in the
poor countries which neighbour the rich regions of the world, e.g. Eastern
and South-Eastern Europe, Northern Africa and Central America, net em-
igration rates are not higher than 0.15 per cent p.a. True, these moderate
figures reflect high legal and administrative barriers to migration. Policy
makers and the populations in the receiving countries therefore fear that
opening the borders to immigration will involve a massive influx of migrants.
The removal of immigration barriers does however not necessarily trigger
mass migration waves, as the enlargement episodes of the European Union
(EU) demonstrate. The introduction of free movement in the context of the
EU’s Southern Enlargement did not increase immigration from the South,
and opening the labour markets to citizens of the New Member States (NMS)
in one-third of the Member States of the EU and the European Economic
Area (EEA) after May 20041 has resulted in a net migration of less than 0.2
per cent of the population of the NMS, despite the GDP per capita in the
NMS being approximately 25% of the average of the old EU member states.2
It is a well-known stylised fact that even in case of large cross-country
differences in income levels only a small share of the populations in the
sending countries actually emigrate. Moreover, net migration rates tend to
cease eventually, even if large differences in earnings across countries persist.3
Even in the golden age of mass migration, the 19th century, only a minority of
the populations in the emigration countries moved, although migration was
not hampered by administrative and legal barriers at these times. Today’s
migration is furthermore chracterised by the fact that the overwhelming share
of the migrants eventually return home, although the length of migration
1Denmark, Iceland, Ireland, Norway and the UK opened their labour markets largely,
and Sweden completely for citizens from the NMS at May 1, 2004.
2Total migration from the NMS into the EU and the other members of the EEA can
be estimated at 100,000 to 150,000 persons in 2004. See Boeri and Bru¨cker (2005) and
the references there.
3Net migration flows from the South to the North of Europe have converged to zero in
most countries during the 1980s, although considerable income differences have remained,
e.g. in case of Greece and Portugal. This is also confirmed by the findings of micro studies:
Baevre et al. (1999) find for the Norwegian emigration episode in the 19th century that
emigration did cease in each cohort after a certain share of the population in this cohort
had left.
2
episodes differs largely across individuals.4
Why do so many individuals stay in their home countries, when others
move at the same time? Why do net migration flows tend to cease even
if large income differences across countries persist? Why do some migrants
return home, while others stay abroad, and why does the length of migra-
tion episodes differ individually? This paper presents a model of temporary
migration with heterogeneous preferences, which addresses these puzzles of
international migration. Most traditional migration models in the litera-
ture treat migration as a permanent decision of rational agents, which are
homogeneous with regard to their preferences and human capital character-
istics.5 Consequently, these models cannot explain heterogeneous migration
behaviour and typically predict that migration does not disappear before
wage differences shrink to a certain threshold level, which equals the mone-
tary and social costs of migration. Starting with the seminal contributions of
Hill (1987) and Djajic and Milbourne (1988) a number of models have mean-
while analysed the phenomenon of temporary migration, but these models
usually ignore the heterogeneity of individuals as well. Consequently, even
though migration is temporary, the same length of migration episodes applies
for all agents.6
This paper takes another route by considering heterogeneous preferences
of individuals with regard to the choice of location. The basic set-up of the
model is related to the standard model of temporary migration originally
4Return migration flows in Europe make up almost 10 per cent of migration stocks
p.a. See the evidence provided by SOPEMI (2003) for a number of OECD countries; for
Germany see Bundesamt (2003). Micro studies indicate that up to 80 per cent of the
migrants in Europe eventually return home (Dustmann, 1995, 2003; Karras and Chiswick,
1999; Mesnard, 2004).
5See the seminal contributions by Hicks (1932), Sjaastad (1961), and Harris and Todaro
(1970), and also the more recent models e.g. by Burda (1995) and Hatton (1995).
6Hill (1987) and Djajic and Milbourne (1988) treat migration as an intertemporal op-
timisation problem, where the length of migration is endogenously determined by host
and home wages and differences in utility between consumption abroad and at home. Yet
as they employ the concept of a representative agent all migration decisions (including
the length of stay) are identical for all agents. Building on these models, Dustmann and
Kirchkamp (2002) and Mesnard (2004) consider problems such as liquidity constraints,
differences in purchasing power parities across countries, and enhanced options for self-
employment for return migrants, but use the concept of a representative agent as well. One
exception in the literature is the model of Stark (1995), which explains differences in mi-
gration duration by asymmetric information concerning the human capital characteristics
of high and low productivity migrants. After the true type is revealed, low-productivity
migrants are dismissed and return home, accordingly displaying a shorter migration dura-
tion than high productivity types. Dustmann (1995), Dustmann and Kirchkamp (2002),
Dustmann (2003) and Mesnard (2004) find indeed micro evidence that the length of mi-
gration episodes depends on individual human capital characteristics.
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developed by Djajic and Milbourne (1988), but departs in several aspects:
First, and most importantly, it is assumed that individuals discount con-
sumption in foreign countries by a certain factor, which varies across indi-
viduals.7 Second, in order to arrive at analytical solutions for the length of
migration spells and aggregate migration stocks and flows, we employ specific
functional forms for the utility function and the distribution of preferences.
Finally, the present model departs from Djajic and Milbourne (1988) and
other models – which assume homogeneity of agents – by determining the
equilibrium amount and duration of migration as driven by the heterogene-
ity of individuals in the population, i.e. in our model it is not necessary
that wages or employment rates react to migration in order to establish an
equilibrium stock of migrants.
Analogously to the recent trade literature with heterogeneous firms, the
present model succeeds in distinguishing between different types of agents
which participate in international migration and those which do not.8 More
specifically, at a given income differential there are three types of individuals:
stayers, i.e. those who stay at home and do not migrate; temporary migrants,
i.e. those who return home within their lifetime; and permanent migrants,
i.e. those who migrate for their entire lifetime. Furthermore, within the
group of temporary migrants, the duration of the migration episode varies
across individuals. Accordingly, aggregate migration flows and stocks are
derived from the heterogeneous behaviour of agents. The average duration
of migration episodes as well as the number of permanent migrants tend to
increase in the income differential. The stock of migrants, i.e. the share of the
population which tends to stay abroad at a certain point of time, increases
with the income differential between the host and the home country as well.
Moreover, the net migration flow is zero in equilibrium. Gross migration
flows remain, however, a positive function of the income differential.
These results have important implications for the empirical analysis of
macro migration flows and stocks: The standard empirical model of migra-
tion, based on the famous Harris and Todaro (1970) model, presume that
an equilibrium between net migration flows and the explanatory variables
emerges. In contrast, our model implies that an equilibrium relationship be-
7Faini and Venturini (1995) consider heterogeneous preferences as well, but do not
explore their consequences for the mechanics of aggregate migration flows and stocks.
Moreover, to the best of our knowledge, the consequences of heterogeneous preferences
have not yet been analysed in the context of temporary migration.
8The rapidly expanding literature on ‘new new’ trade theory with heterogeneous firms
addresses a similar question, i.e. why some firms export and others do not. See Melitz
(2003), Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004), and Yeaple (2005), for a review see Baldwin
and Forslid (2004).
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tween migration stocks and the explanatory variables arises in the long run,
while net flows become zero. Accordingly, we test the hypothesis whether
migration stocks or flows and the explanatory variables form a long-run equi-
librium, or, in technical terms, a cointegration relationship, in the empirical
part of the paper. Our analysis is based on migration to Germany from
EU source countries during the period from 1973 to 2001. Note that the
EU is a natural laboratory for studying international migration behaviour,
since institutional barriers for migration have been removed there since the
late 1960s. Following the Engle and Granger (1987) procedure, we test first
whether the variables of the stock or the flow model form a cointegrated set.
For this purpose, we apply panel unit-root and panel cointegration tests,
which increase the statistical power in comparision to univariate unit-root
and cointgration tests. We find that migration flows are stationary variables
while the explanatory variables such as income and employment variables are
integrated of the first order (I(1) variables). Thus the hypothesis of the tra-
ditional migration model in the empirical literature that migration flows and
the explanatory variables form a cointegrated set, is not supported by our
data set. In contrast, we find that migration stocks are I(1). Moreover, our
panel cointegration tests suggest that the hypothesis that migration stocks
and the explanatory variables form a cointegrated set cannot be rejected.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents
the model of migration with heterogeneous agents. It derives the amount of
permanent and temporary migration as well as the individual and aggregate
duration of migration episodes and presents results for the aggregate migra-
tion stocks and flows. In Section 3 we first discuss alternative flow and stock
specifications for empirical macro migration models, and then apply panel
unit-root and panel cointegration tests in order to test whether the variables
of the alternative models form a cointegrated set. In Section 4 the stock
model is estimated, in particular the cointegrating vectors and the short-run
dynamics of the stock model are estimated by employing an error correction
model. Section 5 concludes.
2 A migration model with heterogeneous
preferences
2.1 The model
Consider an economy where at each instant in time, t, there are N individuals
i born, endowed with one unit of labour each, and who each live for the same
period of time, Ti, normalised to 1, i.e. Ti = 1, ∀ i = 1, ..., N . Each
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individual is continuously employed throughout his or her life but has the
choice of staying abroad for a period τi, where 0 ≤ τi ≤ 1 ∀ i = 1, ..., N .
As in Djajic and Milbourne (1988), agents make and execute their migration
decision at time ti = 0. In the foreign country, each domestic and migrant
worker receives the income level y∗, in the sending country the income level
is y, where y < y∗, i.e. outward migration only occurs from home to foreign
country.9 The utility flows which individuals perceive from consumption
(that is, living) at home and abroad respectively are given by:
u(ci) = c
α
i (1)
u∗(c∗i ) = γ
1−α
i c
∗
i
α , (2)
where ci and c
∗
i are consumption at home and abroad, respectively, α (0 <
α < 1) is a parameter of the utility function, identical for all agents, and
γi ∈ [0, 1] is a preference parameter, which is heterogenous across agents.
The parameter γi captures the fact that individuals receive less utility from
consumption abroad than at home. The utility functions in (1) and (2)
display the feature that the marginal utility enjoyed from the same rate of
consumption is higher at home than abroad, i.e. that u∗′(x) < u′(x), thus
fulfill the conditions laid out in Djajic and Milbourne (1988).10
The lifetime utility of a migrating individual returning to the home coun-
try at time τi can then be written as
11
Vi = τiγ
1−α
i c
∗(t)α + (1− τi)c(t)α. (3)
The intertemporal maximisation problem of the individual is then
straightforward (see e.g. Djajic and Milbourne (1988)): choose the dura-
tion of the stay in the foreign country, τi, and the rates of consumption
over time abroad, c∗i (t), and at home, ci(t), such that lifetime utility (3) is
maximised subject to the budget constraint
τiy
∗ + (1− τi)y − τic∗i (t)− (1− τi)ci(t) ≥ 0. (4)
9Variables with an asterisk denote throughout the Section values in the foreign country.
10As is usual in the literature, we interpret the condition that u∗′(x) < u′(x) to capture
the fact that closer social relations to friends and relatives in the home country, a familiar
cultural environment and other factors associated with the home country result in a higher
utility for the same rate of consumption in the home country (Faini and Venturini, 1995).
11Notice that we ignore discounting by setting the discount factor implicitly to one.
Nevertheless, none of the results below depend on this assumption, see e.g. Dustmann
(2003), Dustmann and Kirchkamp (2002), and Mesnard (2004) for a similar approach.
Discounting is, however, included in Djajic and Milbourne (1988).
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The first-order conditions (see Appendix A.1) give rise to the following rela-
tions:
αγ1−αi c
∗
i (t)
−(1−α) = λ, (5)
αci(t)
−(1−α) = λ, (6)
γ1−αi c
∗
i (t)
α − ci(t)α = λ (c∗i (t)− ci(t) + y − y∗) , (7)
τi (y
∗ − y + ci(t)− c∗i (t)) = ci(t)− y. (8)
Since the shadow value of wealth, λ, is time-invariant, (5) and (6) imply that
c∗i (t) = c
∗
i and ci(t) = ci, ∀ i = 1, ..., N , i.e. consumption at home and abroad
is constant over time. Moreover, equating the left-hand side of (5) and (6)
gives:
c∗i = γici . (9)
Thus consumption during the migrants stay abroad is a fraction of the con-
sumption upon his/her return to the home country. Next, from (9) and (7),
after substituting λ from (6), we are able to solve for ci:
ci =
α
1− α
1
1− γi (y
∗ − y) , (10)
i.e. consumption at home – and thus via (9) also consumption abroad – is a
linear function of the income differential.12
Finally, using (9), (10) and (8) one can calculate the optimal length of a
migrants’s stay abroad:
τi =
α
1− γi −
(1− α)y
y∗ − y . (11)
This optimal duration of migration displays the following reactions to changes
in the various parameters (see Appendix A.2). With respect to the income
levels, we find that ∂τi
∂y
< 0 and ∂τi
∂y∗ > 0, thus an increase in foreign income,
a reduction in the domestic income and hence a widening of the income
gap leads to longer migration periods for all migrants. Furthermore, as one
would expect intuitively, ∂τi
∂γi
> 0, namely, individuals who have less of a
utility discount when consuming abroad display longer migration duration.
Equations (9), (10) and (11) characterise the agents’ migration and con-
sumption behavior in the economy and are largely in line with results found
in the literature following Hill (1987) and Djajic and Milbourne (1988).13
On this basis, we are now equipped to explore the consequences of agent
heterogeneity for aggregated migration patterns.
12Notice that the consumption patterns established in (10) and (9) also define the savings
path, e.g. s∗i (t) = y
∗ − c∗i for t = 0, ..., τi.
13One important difference does exist, however: Djajic and Milbourne (1988) find an
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2.2 Results
Given the above model we can derive results concerning agent heterogeneity,
migration decisions and migration flows and stocks.
Permanent and temporary migrants and stayers
The optimal value of τi given in (11) may well be larger than an agent’s total
lifetime, Ti = 1. This becomes more likely for very high γi, an individual
with a small utility discount when living abroad, or for α close to 1 or for a
very large income gap y∗ − y. In fact, what a τi ≥ 1 implies is that an agent
becomes a permanent migrant: the utility value of living and consuming
abroad is so large that given the higher income level in the foreign country,
returning – even in the last instant of life – creates no additional value. Define
by γ¯ the individual who is indifferent to the question of returning (temporary
migration) vs. staying abroad forever (permanent migration). Solving τi = 1
from (11) for γ gives the first result:
Lemma 1. The group of permanent migrants consists of all individuals i
with
γi ≥ γ¯ = (1− α)y
∗
y∗ − αy . (12)
Solving for the consumption volume of a permanent migrant from (9)
and (10) after setting γi = γ¯, one can verify that c
∗
i = y
∗, i.e. permanent
migrants spend their total income in the foreign country and do not save.
Furthermore, ∂γ¯
∂y∗ < 0, such that an increase in the foreign income level –
or an increase in the income gap – lowers the threshold value of γi, beyond
which individuals become permanent migrants.
At the other end of the spectrum, we have those agents who prefer to
stay at home instead of migrating. Define by γ the individual who is com-
pletely indifferent to the question of migrating vs. staying at home, i.e. the
individual whose optimal migration duration is τi = 0. Solving τi = 0 from
(11) for γ gives:
Lemma 2. The group of stayers (non-migrants) consists of all individuals i
with
γi ≤ γ = y − αy
∗
(1− α)y . (13)
ambiguous effect of foreign income on the migration duration, since a higher income might
result in an earlier return to the home country if the utility function is characterised by a
low rate of substitution. This case is excluded here through the specific functional form
of utility.
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Since γi ∈ [0, 1], a necessary condition for at least one individual in the
sense of lemma 2 to exist is that y∗ < y/α. if this condition is violated,
then the income gap is so substantial, that all all individuals of the sending
country would migrate. For the sake of realism it is assumed that y∗ < y/α
is fulfilled in the remainder of the Section. Notice that
∂γ
∂y∗ < 0, such that
an increase in the foreign income level lowers the threshold value γ, implying
that fewer agents are stayers.
It is easy to verify that γ¯ in (12) is always larger than γ in (13) as long
as the income gap y∗ − y is positive. Accordingly, there exists a third group
of agents that maximise utility with a τi ∈]0, 1[, i.e. individuals who spend
part of their working lives abroad and part at home – temporary migrants.
Following the reasoning above, temporary migrants are characterised as fol-
lows:
Lemma 3. The group of temporary migrants consists of all individuals i with
γi ∈ ]γ, γ¯[ .
Thus, the above results establish that within the population of the home
country, three types of agents can be distinguished. While all permanent mi-
grants display identical consumption and migration durations – as do stayers
– the group of temporary migrants features varying durations of migration
spells. Figure 1 plots the qualities implied by the optimal migration duration
from (11) and lemma 1, 2 and 3.
The aggregate duration of migration
In order to analyse aggregate effects, the distribution of γi’s in the population
must be specified. Here we assume the γi’s in each cohort to be uniformly
distributed on support [0,1]. Accordingly the area under the curve in Figure
1 represents the aggregate duration of all migration spells for a cohort. While
τi is by definition zero for stayers and one for permanent migrants, Figure
1 shows that the migration duration is monotonically increasing in γ in the
interval between γ¯ and γ.
Integrating (11) over the interval γ to γ¯ gives the aggregate duration
θt =
∫ γ¯
γ
τi of temporary migrants:
θt = αN
(
ln
(
y∗ − y α
y (1− α)
)
− y
∗ − y
y∗ − αy
)
. (14)
The resulting θt captures the total migration duration of all temporary
migrants of a cohort, thus in effect both the number of temporary migrants
9
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Figure 1: The duration of migration spells for different agents
as well as their individual migration durations are captured. As one would
intuitively expect, it can be shown that ∂θ
t
∂y∗ > 0, i.e. an increase in for-
eign income levels has an unambiguously positive effect on the duration of
aggregated temporary migration.
Next, under the assumption of uniformly distributed γi’s, the duration of
aggregated permanent migration of a cohort simply becomes
θp = 1(1− γ¯)N = (y
∗ − y)αN
y∗ − αy . (15)
Finally, the number of stayers – and since Ti = 1 also their aggregate
time spent at home – found in a cohort is simply γN = (y−αy
∗)N
(1−α)y .
Combining (14) and (15), we obtain the following result:
Proposition 1. The aggregate duration of migration, θ, from a single cohort
is
θ = αN ln
(
y∗ − αy
y (1− α)
)
, (16)
• increases in the foreign income level, ∂θ
∂y∗ > 0, and
• falls in the domestic income level, ∂θ
∂y
< 0
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Equation (16) arrives at a surprisingly simple specification of the total
duration of time spent abroad by the migrants in a given cohort. Lemma
1, 2 and 3 and proposition 1 have clear implications for migration stocks,
migration flows and their interaction.
Migration flows and migration stocks
Moving from the migration decisions and durations in a single cohort to
migration stocks, one has to specify the number of cohorts coexisting at
any instant in time. Let L denote this number. Assuming zero population
growth – that is a rate of reproduction of 1 – then the total population at
any point in time is LN . Furthermore, assume that each cohort is identical
to the previous including their consumption and migration decisions but that
descendants’ γi’s are uncorrelated to their parents γi’s and that reproduction
takes place at the end of an agents lifetime.14 This leads to the following
results:
Proposition 2. The population stocks at every instant in time are
a) stock of permanent migrants: Sp = LN(1− γ¯) = LN α(y∗−y)
y∗−αy .
b) stock of temporary migrants: St = LN θ
t
N(γ¯−γ)(γ¯ − γ)
= −αNL
y∗−y α
(
y∗ − y − (y∗ − y α) ln
(
y∗−y α
y (1−α)
))
.
c) total stock of migrants: S = Sp + St = αNL ln
(
y∗−αy
y (1−α)
)
.
d) total stock of home population: H = NL− S(t)
= NL
(
1− α ln
(
y∗−αy
y (1−α)
))
.
Proof (sketch): Proposition 2 a) is the aggregate of all permanent migrants
in one cohort times the number of cohorts coexisting at every point in time.
Since we have normalized the agent’s lifetime to one, this turns out to be
Sp = Lθp. Proposition 2 b) is the average duration of the migration spell of
a temporary migrant, θ
t
N(γ¯−γ) times the total number of temporary migrants
coexisting at every instant in time, LN(γ¯ − γ). It follows that St(t) =
Lθt. Finally, proposition 2 c) follows from a) and b) and thus S = Lθ, and
proposition 2 d) follows from c). Thus the stock of migrants is here a fairly
simple logarithmic relation of the income gap.
14This last assumption implies that temporary migrants give birth after they returned
to the home country, while only permanent migrants give birth abroad.
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Figure 2: Migration stocks and stock of home population
To see what the relations derived in proposition 2 imply consider Figure 2.
Figure 2 plots the stock of temporary, permanent, and total migration as well
as the stock of home population as a function of foreign income, y∗. For the
actual plot, the following parameter values are employed: y = 100, α = 0.3,
N = 1000 and L = 100. At y∗ = 100 there is no income gap and accordingly
all agents spend all their working life at home. As the income gap widens,
there are initially a few individuals who opt for permanent migration and a
few who opt for temporary migration. However, since the income differential
is small, the actual amount of time spent abroad is small too. Accordingly
from the perspective of the aggregate migration stock, temporary migration
contributes relatively little to total migration compared to permanent migra-
tion since permanent migrants spend their entire lifetimes abroad. As the
income gap widens, the role of temporary migration increases while that of
permanent migration decreases.
Finally, consider the migration flows associated with the above stocks, in
particular measuring flows occurring during any time interval of length 1.
Given that reproduction takes place at the end of an agents life, the number
of birth abroad occurring over the time interval 1 are LN(1− γ¯) (= Sp) while
LNγ¯ birth take place at home, i.e. the entire population has been renewed,
however part of any descendant generation are born abroad by migrants.
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Proposition 3. Migration flows over any time interval of length 1 are
a) gross emigration: M e = LNγ¯ (1− γ) = LNαy∗(y∗−y)
y(y∗−αy) .
b) gross return migration of home born agents: M r,h = LNγ¯ (γ¯ − γ)
= LNαy
∗(y∗−y)2
y(y∗−αy)2 .
c) gross return migration of foreign born agents: M r,f = LN(1− γ¯) γ¯
= LNαy
∗(y∗−y)(1−α)
(y∗−αy)2 .
d) net migration: M =M e −M r,h −M r,f = 0
Proof (sketch): Since all individuals that migrate do so at time ti = 0,
proposition 3 a) is simply the sum of all home born (LNγ¯) temporary and
permanent migrants. Proposition 3 b) follows from the fact that all cohorts
behave identically, such that in equilibrium for every home born temporary
outmigrant there is a matching temporary return migrant born in one of the
previous cohorts. The return flow of foreign born agents in proposition 3
c) is composed of the share of stayers and temporary migrants (γ¯) in the
total foreign born population (LN(1 − γ¯)); or put differently, except for
those agents that decide to be permanent migrants all other foreign born
individuals will return at some point in time during their life to the home
land. Proposition 3 d) follows from a), b) and c).
That the net flow of migrants associated with a given income differential
and equilibrium stocks turns out to be zero is driven by the assumption that
reproduction takes place at the end of an agents life time. If instead, one
assumed that reproduction takes place earlier in an agents life, then some of
the temporary migrants would reproduce while staying abroad generating an
additional – and unmatched – flow of return migrants that results in negative
net migration.
Figure 3 plots the migration flows given in proposition 3, for various levels
of foreign income, when y = 100, α = 0.3, N = 1000 and L = 100.
Corollary 1. All migration stocks Sp, St and S and the migration flows M e,
M r,h and M r,f are positive and increasing in the income differential y∗ − y.
The net migration flow M is zero and independent of the income differential
y∗ − y.
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Figure 3: Migration flows in equilibrium
3 Stock vs. flow models
The above results and particular Corollary 1 have important consequences
for the empirical estimation of macro migration models. It follows from
our model that an equilibrium relationship between the income differential
and migration stocks but not flows emerges in the long-run. A positive net
migration flow can only occur during the transition to some steady state.
15 Yet, most macro migration models in the empirical literature to date
state explicitly or implicitly that an equilibrium between migration flows
and explanatory variables such as the income differential does exists.
We examine these competing hypotheses of the stock and flow models
empirically within a cointegration framework. The concept of cointegration
is closely related to the notion of equilibrium: a cointegration relationship
between variables exists if economic forces drive the system towards the equi-
librium defined by the long-run relationship posited (Engle and Granger,
1987). When considering long-run relationships, it becomes necessary to
consider the underlying properties of the processes that generate time series
variables. If variables follow different stochastic processes over time, spurious
15Notice, that this reasoning abstracts from differences in population growth rates
among the migrant and the home population and other aspects such as the assimilation
and naturalisation of migrants.
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regression results can arise that suggest statistically significant long-run rela-
tionships between variables, when in fact this is merely evidence of contem-
poraneous correlations rather than meaningful causal relationships (Granger
and Newbold, 1974).
Following the (Engle and Granger, 1987) procedure, we first test for both
the stock and the flow model whether the dependent and the explanatory
variables are integrated of the same order, and, if this is the case, whether
the hypothesis of a cointegration relationship is rejected by our data set.
We apply panel unit-root and panel cointegration tests, which increases the
statistical power of the tests significantly in comparision to tests based on
individual time series. Given a relatively short time dimension in our data
set, we use in the final step a dynamic specification for the estimation of the
cointegrating vectors and the short-run dynamics.
3.1 Two alternative specifications
The stock model of macro migration implied by Proposition 3, gives for the
aggregate migration stock
s = α ln
(
y∗
(1− α)y −
α
1− α
)
,
where s is defined as the share of the migration stock in the total population
of the sending country, i.e. s ≡ S/(LN). For empirical purposes, one can
approximate the expression for s by
s = β0 + β1 ln
(
y∗
y
)
+ β2 ln(y).
We follow furthermore Todaro (1969) and Harris and Todaro (1970) in as-
suming that income levels are conditioned by employment opportunities in
the respective locations. More specifically, if jobs are allocated in each period
randomly among the workforce, we can write expected income as the wage
times the employment rate, i.e. as w × e. If individuals are risk averse and
uncertainty focusses on employment opportunities, it can be expected that
the coefficients for the employment variables are larger than those for the
wage variables (Hatton, 1995). Moreover, since employment opportunities of
migrants in host countries are below those of natives, the coefficient for the
employment rate in the host country is larger than that in the source country.
Finally, if capital markets are not perfect, liquidity constraints affect migra-
tion decisions. Consequently, for a given income difference between the host
and the home country, the income level in the source country has a positive
impact on migration (Faini and Venturini, 1995).
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Based on these considerations we derive the following parsimonious spec-
ification for the long-run migration function:
sit = a0 + a1 ln
(
wft
wit
)
+ a2 ln(wit) + a3 ln(eft) + a4 ln(eit) + νit, (17)
where i = 1, ..., K and t = 1, ..., T are the source country and time indices,
sit denotes the migration stock as a percentage of the home population in
country i, wft the wage rate in the host country, wit the wage rate in the home
country i, eft the employment rate in the host country, eit the employment
rate in the home country i, and νit is the error term. The error term is
specified as a one-way error component model (Hsiao, 1986), i.e. as νit =
µi + εit, where µi is a country-specific effect and εit is white noise.
Compare this to a macro migration model based on migration flows. The
standard equation in the empirical literature has the following form (see e.g.
Hatton (1995)):
mit = b0 + b1 ln
(
wft
wit
)
+ b2 ln(wit) + b3 ln(eft) + (18)
b4 ln(eit) + b5sit + νit,
where mit denotes the net (gross) migration rate as percentage of the home
population in country i, i.e. the net flow. The existing stock of migrants is
included on the right hand side of the model as a proxy for ’social network’
effects which are expected to increase the propensity to migrate by alleviating
the adaptation costs in the host country, see Hugo (1981), Massey and Espana
(1987), Massey (1990a), Massey (1990b) and Bauer (1995).16
The estimation of the migration functions in equations (17) and (18) can
be affected by spurious correlation effects if the regressions involve variables
that follow an I(1) or other non-stationary process (see the seminal paper
by Granger and Newbold (1974)). The notable exception is the situation
when I(1) dependent and explanatory variables form a cointegration set,
see Engle and Granger (1987). While there is a general agreement that
macroeconomic variables such as income levels and employment rates are
rather well represented as I(1) processes, there is still limited evidence on the
time series properties of the migration flows and corresponding migrant stock
variables. One of the few exceptions in the literature is the Hatton (1995)
paper, which provides empirical evidence that all variables in equation (18)
16Of course, there exist more possible macro models of migration. The semi-logarithmic
functional form has been derived from first principles by (Hatton, 1995), but double-log
specifications of macro migration models are common in the literature as well (e.g. Faini
and Venturini (1995), Hille and Straubhaar (2001)).
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are I(1) for UK-US migration from 1870 to 1913, but it is unclear whether
this is also supported by other data sets. Particularly puzzling is the fact that
the migration flow and the migration stock variable are included in equation
(18). Since migration flows can be conceived as (almost) the first difference
of migration stocks, they can hardly be I(1) variables if migration stocks
are supposed to be I(1) variables as well. Thus, it is reasonable to expect
that the migration flow variable is better approximated by an I(0) process if
migration stocks are I(1). In this case it is suitable to use the stock model
in equation (17) for estimating the long-run migration function.
3.2 Data
A time series analysis of the economic forces which drive international mi-
gration requires that migration behaviour is not distorted by institutional
or administrative barriers. The EU forms therefore a natural laboratory for
students of international migration, since it is the only regional trade area
in the world where the free movement of labour and other persons is one of
the fundamental freedoms of the common market.17 The free movement has
been fixed already in the Treaty of Rome 1957, and introduced for the six
Member States of the then European Economic Community in 1968. In the
following decades it has been step by step extended to the 30 members of the
EU and European Economic Area (incl. Switzerland), although transitional
periods have been applied in the cases of Southern Enlargement of the EU
and the present extension of the EU to Central and Eastern Europe.
The sample employed here comprises the migration data from the found-
ing members of the European Community and the three countries from the
first Enlargement round (Denmark, Ireland, United Kingdom) to Germany in
the period 1973 to 2001. Germany has been chosen as a destination country
since it is not only the largest destination of international migration in the
EU, but it also reports data on migration stocks and flows since 1967. We
begin our analysis in 1973 since this is the year of the first enlargement round.
Moreover, the migration data are subject to a visible structural break in 1973
as a consequence of the first oil-price shock. Other events which might have
affected migration behaviour such as German unification do not show up in
the data as visible structural breaks.
The data on migration stocks and flows come from the German Fed-
eral Statistical Office (’Statistisches Bundesamt’). For the stock of mi-
grants, foreign residents as reported by the Central Register of Foreigners
17Free labour mobility has been also granted in the Nordic trade area, whose member
countries however belong all to EU or the European Economic Area today.
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(’Ausla¨nderzentralregister’) are used as a variable.18 The stock of foreign
residents is reported on December 31 of each year (in some early years on
September 30).19 The number of foreign residents is slightly overstated by
the Central Register of Foreigners, since return migration is not completely
registered by the municipalities. Consequently, the figures for the stock of
foreign residents has been revised two times following the population cen-
suses of 1972 and 1987. In the econometric analysis, dummy variables are
used to control for these statistical breaks.
The data on migration flows stem again from the Central Register of For-
eigners. We consider three flow variables: net migration flows, mit, gross
inflows, imit, and gross return flows, reit. The migration stock and flow vari-
ables are normalised by the population of the home countries, i.e. they are
calculated as shares of the corresponding home population. Population fig-
ures are depicted from the World Bank’s 2002 World Development Indicators
and OECD sources. As a proxy for wages and other incomes, the historical
series of per capita GDP levels in purchasing power parities from Maddison
(1995) has been used. These figures have been extrapolated up to 2001 on
basis of the Main Economic Indicators of the OECD. The employment rate
is defined as one minus the unemployment rate. Unemployment rates have
been taken again from the OECD Main Economic Indicators, and, if not
available, complemented by data from national statistical offices. The ILO
definition has been used for all unemployment rates.
The descriptive statistics are shown in Table 1.
Table 1 about here
18Note that all residents of Germany are obliged to register their place of residence. The
figures from the central register of foreigners are based on the reports of the municipalities.
19It is sometimes argued that natural population growth and naturalisations distort the
migration stock variable. By definition, the increase of the stock of foreign residents equals
net immigration plus natural population growth minus the number of naturalisations plus
reporting errors for a given period of time. Since our migration variables are calculated
as rates, natural population growth cancels out if the rate of natural population growth
of migrants equals the rate of natural population growth in the home countries. Thus, if
natural population growth of the migrant population in Germany and the source country
is similar and the rate of naturalisations is low, the annual increase of the stock of foreign
residents as a share in the home population equals almost annual net immigration. Indeed,
the annual increase of migration stocks as a share of home population almost equals net
immigration rates in our sample.
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3.3 Testing for unit roots
In the first step of the empirical analysis, the variables are tested for unit
roots for making inference on the order of integration. To this end, the
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test is used for the individual time series
and the panel unit root test suggested in Im, Pesaran, and Shin (2003) (IPS-
test). The argument for using panel unit root tests instead of univariate unit
root tests is that the latter tests are notoriously weak when the root is close
to one. In addition, as argued in Shiller and Perron (1985), the problem is
aggravated for short time series. Hence, by using the panel data unit root
tests, a dramatic increase in terms of power can be achieved (see Levin, Lin,
and Chu, 2002).
Tables 2-4 report the results of the ADF and IPS unit-root tests performed
on the host- and home-country-specific economic variables. For the IPS-test,
the t¯-statistic is presented together with the respective critical values, as
well as the w(t¯)-statistic, which is normally distributed (Im, Pesaran, and
Shin, 2003). The auxiliary regressions include either an intercept only or an
intercept together with a linear deterministic time trend. We present both
the results with and without a deterministic trend, since it is not obvious a
priori whether the variables considered here exhibit a trending behaviour or
not.
Table 2 to 4 about here
As expected, the null hypothesis that the macroeconomic variables, i.e.
the relative income ratio and the employment rates, follow I(1) processes,
cannot be rejected either in the panel unit root tests or in the majority
of the individual ADF tests. Moreover, the null of an I(1) process cannot
be rejected for the migrant stock variable either. In contrast, the null of a
unit root is clearly rejected for the net and gross migration flow variables
in the panel unit root tests. In case of the net and gross migration inflow
variable the null of a unit root is rejected by the overwhelming majority of
the individual ADF tests, while in case of the gross return migration flow
only a minority of the individual ADF tests rejects the null of a unit root.
Note that the finding that panel unit root tests clearly reject the null of a
unit root for the migration flow variables, while tests for the individual time
series do not, is common in the empirical literature (see Wu and Zhang, 1996;
Wu, 1996; Papell, 1997).
Thus, the main conclusion from the unit root tests is that the assumption
of the standard migration model, that migration flows on the one hand, and
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macroeconomic variables such as GDP per capita levels or employment rates
on the other hand, are integrated of the same order, is not supported by
the data set employed here. As a consequence, the regression equation is
unbalanced as the chosen dependent variable (net or gross migration flows),
which has been found to be I(0) variables, is explained by non-stationary I(1)
variables.
3.4 Testing for panel cointegration
In order to reconcile the features of the data with the theoretical consid-
erations, the long-run migration function of the migration stock model as
specified in equation (17) is employed for the analysis that follows. Accord-
ing to the unit root test results, all the variables of the stock model seem to
be I(1), such that they can hypothetically form a cointegration set. Under
the assumption of cointegration, the remainder term ²it is assumed to be an
I(0) variable.
Two specifications of this cointegrating relation are used here: one with-
out a linear deterministic trend and one with. In economic terms, the pres-
ence of a linear trend in the regression accounts for the constant growth rate
in the migration stock that has been caused by other factors than the in-
come differential and employment conditions. These socioeconomic factors
that are not modelled explicitly reflect inter alia different rates of natural
population growth in the receiving and the sending countries and decreasing
moving costs over time.
Two sets of cointegration tests are reported in Table 5. The first set
comprises the results of the two-step Engle-Granger cointegration procedure
performed for the variables of every country. The second set comprises the
panel cointegration group t−test statistics of Pedroni (1999) which aggre-
gates the test statistics obtained in the first place for every country in the
panel. For both the specifications without and with trend, the null hypothe-
sis of no cointegration is rejected for 6 out of the 8 countries, albeit in some
cases only at the 10% significance level. The more powerful panel cointegra-
tion test of Pedroni (1999) rejects the null hypothesis of no cointegration for
both model specifications at the 5% significance level.
Table 5 about here
Thus, the results of the cointegration tests suggest that we cannot reject
the hypothesis that the variables of the stock model form a cointegrated set.
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This allows to estimate the model in equation (17) in order to draw inferences
on the parameter values of the cointegrating relations.
4 Estimating the stock model
There are different procedures for estimating both the long-run cointegra-
tion relationship and the short-run dynamics. If the variables form a cointe-
grated set, the cointegrating vector can be consistently estimated in a static
regression which completely omits the dynamics of the model (Engle and
Granger, 1987). Although the famous super-consistency result (Stock, 1987)
indicates that convergence is rather fast, the asymptotic distribution of the
least squares estimator and the associated t-statistics is non-normal in finite
samples. Moreover, an unadressed ’endogeneity bias’ invalidates standard
hypothesis testing in samples of finite size.20 Monte-Carlo evidence suggests
that the estimation bias of the cointegrating parameter is smaller in dynamic
than in static models (Banerjee, Dolado, Henry, and Smith, 1986). The em-
pirical equation is therefore specified here in form of an error correction model
(ECM), which allows estimation of both the long-term cointegrating vector
and the short-run dynamics. Note that the ECM has a flexible functional
form and imposes few restrictions on the adjustment process.
Specifically, the estimation model has the form
∆sit = β1si,t−1 + β2 ln
(
wf,t−1
wi,t−1
)
+ β3 ln(wi,t−1) + β4 ln(ef,t−1) + (19)
β5 ln(ei,t−1) + β6∆ ln
(
wft
wit
)
+ β7∆ ln(wit) + β8∆ ln(eft) +
β9∆ ln(eit) + β10∆si,t−1 + η′zit + µ∗i + εit,
where µ∗i = µi/ − β1 is the long-run value for the country-specific effect, ∆
the first-difference operator, zit a vector of institutional variables and η the
corresponding vector of coefficients. Three dummy variables are considered
here which should capture the different institutional conditions of migra-
tion: guestworker agreements between Germany and the sending country,
free movement between the sending country and Germany, and dictatorship
in the sending country. The first two variables should cover reduced legal
and administrative barriers to migration, the last variable political ’push’
factors in the source country. Note that the adjustment parameter of the
ECM is given by -β1, and that the long-term coefficients of the cointegrat-
ing relationship are given by -βk/β1, where k = 2, 3...5. Further lags of the
20See Patterson (2000) for a detailed discussion.
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first differences of the dependent variable and lags of first differences of the
explanatory variables have not been considered in this specification of the
ECM since they appear not significant.
The estimation results of the short-run semi-elasticities of the dynamic
model are presented in Table 6. The model is first estimated with a standard
fixed effects (within) model (FE). The results of the F -test show that the
country-specific effects are indeed highly significant. However, estimating
the fixed effects model with ordinary least squares (OLS) may yield incon-
sistent results if the disturbances are heteroscedastic. One way to obtain a
robust covariance matrix is to estimate the model with feasible least squares,
which allows for group-wise heteroscedasticity (FGLS(HET)). The likelihood
ratio test indeed suggests that the model which allows for group-wise het-
eroscedasticity is preferable to the homoscedastic model. Finally, spheri-
cal disturbances such as common macroeconomic shocks might affect the
estimation results. The FGLS(HET+COR) estimator relaxes the assump-
tion of no spherical disturbances by allowing for contemporary correlations
across groups. The LR test indicates that the model which allows for both
group-wise heteroscedasticity and cross-sectional correlation is preferable to
the model which only allows for groupwise heteroscedasticity.21 Thus, the
FGLS(HET + COR) can be expected to yield the most reliable results
among the estimators considered here. One caveat is, however, worth noting:
the FGLS(HET+COR) estimator tends to understate the standard errors,
such that significance levels have to be taken with a grain of salt.
Table 6 about here
Moreover, other objections can be raised against the estimators used here:
First, as with all standard panel estimators, the fixed effects estimators are
based on the fundamental assumption that the slope parameters are homo-
geneous. There are good reasons to call this assumption into question. In
(Bru¨cker and Siliverstovs, 2004), the results of various heterogeneous esti-
mators are compared with standard panel estimators in order to shed light
on this issue. It can be shown that traditional panel outperform heteroge-
neous estimators which allow the slope parameters to differ with regard to
their forecasting performance (Bru¨cker and Siliverstovs, 2004). Second, the
estimation of dynamic models in samples with a finite time dimension can
be affected by simultaneous equation bias, which is caused by the correlation
of the lagged dependent variable with the error term. This bias disappears
21All test results are presented in the notes of Table 6.
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with the time dimension of the panel. It is questionable whether alterna-
tive estimation procedures which address the simultaneous equation bias are
preferable to standard panel estimators if the time dimension of the panel
is substantially larger than the group dimension. Again, it can be shown
that the forecasting errors of GMM estimators which address this problem
is larger than that of traditional panel estimators (Bru¨cker and Siliverstovs,
2004).
Before interpreting the estimation results, recall that according to the the-
oretical considerations discussed in Section 3.1, positive signs are expected
for the difference in per capita GDP levels, the per capita GDP level in the
sending country, and the employment rate in the host country, and negative
signs for home employment rates since they increase employment opportuni-
ties in the source country.
The estimation results confirm these expectations: first, the coefficient for
the lagged migration rate is negative and highly significant. Note that this
further supports the stock model, since most flow models expect a positive
coefficient for (lagged) migration stocks. However, the coefficients for the
lagged first difference of the migration stock is positive and again highly
significant in all three regressions. This can be interpreted as evidence of
so-called network or ’herd effects’ (Epstein and Hillman, 1998). In the long
run, however, the propensity to migrate in the sending countries decreases
as the share of the population already living abroad increases.
Second, both for the income differential and home income, we find the
expected positive coefficients. In most regressions, these effects are highly
significant. One exception is the FGLS(HET) model, where the income dif-
ferential is only significant at the 10% level.
Third, the employment rate in the receiving country is highly significant
in all regressions and its coefficient is substantially larger than the coefficient
for the income difference. This highlights the importance of labour market
conditions in the host countries and confirms the expectations outlined in
Section 3.1. The employment rate in the sending countries has the expected
negative coefficient and is significant in all three regressions. However, this
parameter has a much smaller value than the employment rate in the re-
ceiving country, which again supports the expectations stated in Section 3.1.
Note that many empirical studies find that home employment opportunities
have been insignificant or have actually increased migration (see Greenwood
(1975) for a review). The results here do not confirm these findings, but they
do show that home employment has a much weaker impact than employment
in the receiving countries. One possible explanation for this phenomenon is
that favorable employment opportunities in home countries might have am-
biguous effects on migration, since higher employment rates reduce incentives
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to seek employment abroad on the one hand, while on the other they help to
lift liquidity constraints that potential migrants face, and in doing so, may
encourage migration.
Fourth, the variables in first differences again have the expected signs,
but do not appear significant in all regressions. Given the rather short time
dimension of the panel, this is not surprising.
Fifth, the institutional variables have the expected signs in all regressions,
but we observe substantial differences in the size of the parameters and their
significance. The coefficient of the guestworker dummy is large and appears
highly significant in all three regressions. In contrast, the size of the parame-
ter for the free movement dummy is only one-tenth of that of the guestworker
dummy. Moreover, it only appears significant in the FGLS(HET+COR) re-
gression, there however at the 1% level. The rather low impact of the free
movement dummy might be explained by the rather low variance in the
sample: in past accession rounds, free movement was only granted either
to countries with a similar or higher per capita income to the existing EU
Members (Austria, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, UK), or to
countries where the stock of migrants was already very large and presumably
close to equilibrium levels (Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain). Thus, the vari-
ance in the sample might be too low to detect the impact of free movement
from past Enlargement episodes. Finally, the estimated parameter for the
dictatorship dummy appears to be large and highly significant. This result
highlights the well-known fact that political push-factors have an important
impact on migration and can easily dominate economic forces.
To sum up, these results do all indicate the model of migration stocks to
be both of empirical relevance and to yielding sound results.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we examined the macro determinants of migration both from a
theoretical and an empirical perspective. Our theoretical model provides re-
sults for a long-run equilibrium, in which individuals can stay their entire life
in the home country, migrate temporarily abroad – with individual durations
of migration spells – or stay permanently in a foreign country depending on
their preferences. This model generated insights in the mechanics of migra-
tion stocks and flows. The number of migrants, the duration of migration
spells and consequently the stock of migrants all increase with the income
difference between the host and the home country, while net migration ceases
to zero. Consequently, existing empirical migration models, estimating net
migration flows instead of stocks, may be misspecified.
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In the empirical part of the paper the determinants of international mi-
gration have been analysed within a cointegration framework. The method-
ological aspects of the analysis can be summarised as follows: first, the results
of the panel unit-root and panel cointegration test suggest that the standard
flow migration model is misspecified – at least for the data set used here.
The traditional migration model in the empirical model explains migration
flows by a number of explanatory variables such as GDP per capita, (un-
)employment rates, (lagged) migration stocks and institutional variables. It
is widely acknowledged in the literature that macroeconomic variables such
as GDP and employment are non-stationary variables, or, more specifically,
I(1) variables. The existence of a long-run equilibrium between migration
flows and the traditional set of macroeconomic variables requires therefore
that migration flows are I(1) as well. The tests carried out in the empirical
part of this paper, however, indicate that migration rates are stationary, while
migration stocks are I(1) variables. Moreover, the empirical analysis carried
out here suggests that the hypothesis of a cointegration relationship between
migration stocks and the explanatory variables cannot be rejected for our
data set. This can be interpreted as empirical support for the theoretical hy-
pothesis that migration stocks and explanatory variables such as the income
differential and employment variables form an equilibrium relationship.
Our findings have some important policy consequences. The flow model
suggests that migration does not stop before expected income levels between
host and source countries have converged to a certain threshold level. In case
of persistent differences in expected income levels, either the total popula-
tion will eventually migrate or migration will not occur in the first place. In
contrast, the stock model predicts that migration ceases when the benefits
of migration equal the costs to the marginal migrant, such that a long-run
equilibrium between migration stocks and expected income emerges. Conse-
quently, migration may cease despite the existence of large income differences.
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A Appendix
A.1 First-order conditions of the Lagrangian of the mi-
grant’s maximisation problem
Define by L the Lagrangian for the maximisation problem in (3) under the
budget constraint (4). The first-order conditions are:
∂L
∂c∗i (t)
= αγ1−αi c
∗−(1−α)
i − λ = 0 , (A.1)
∂L
∂ci(t)
= αc
−(1−α)
i − λ = 0 , (A.2)
∂L
∂τi
= γ1−αi c
∗
i (t)
α − ci(t)α − λ(c∗i (t)− ci(t) + y − y∗) = 0 , (A.3)
∂L
∂λ
= τiy
∗ + (1− τi)y − τic∗i (t)− (1− τi)ci(t) = 0 , (A.4)
where λ is the shadow value of wealth.
A.2 Derivatives of the optimal τi
Differentiating (11) with respect to y∗, y and γi gives:
∂τi
∂y∗
=
y − y α
(y∗ − y)2 > 0 , (A.5)
∂τi
∂y
=
y∗ (α− 1)
(y∗ − y)2 < 0 , (A.6)
∂τi
∂γi
=
α
(1− γ)2 > 0 . (A.7)
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics
standard
variable obs. mean deviation minimum maximum
sit 594 0.8510 0.9860 0.0370 4.5650
mit 594 0.0002 0.0008 -0.0053 0.0073
imit 594 0.0009 0.0012 0.0001 0.0107
ln(wft/wit) 594 0.2420 0.3740 -0.3820 1.5880
ln(wit) 594 9.4550 0.4250 7.7760 10.3470
ln(eft) 33 -0.0580 0.0290 -0.0990 -0.0060
ln(eit) 594 -0.0660 0.0490 -0.2770 0.0000
GUESTit 594 0.0340 0.1810 0 1
FREEit 594 0.5640 0.4960 0 1
DIKTit 594 0.0490 0.2160 0 1
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Table 2: Unit-root test results (sit, mit)
sit mit
without with trend without with trend
test- test- test- test-
stat. lags stat. lags stat. lags stat. lags
AUS -3.082∗∗ 0 -2.742 0 -3.648∗∗∗ 1 -4.519∗∗∗ 1
BEL -1.474 0 -2.846 1 -3.441∗∗ 1 -4.109∗∗ 1
DK -0.375 1 -2.631 1 -3.754∗∗ 3 -4.116∗∗ 1
ESP -1.223 1 -2.018 1 -4.745∗∗∗ 1 -4.664∗∗∗ 1
FIN -0.770 1 -2.145 1 -2.606 0 -2.660 0
FRA -0.895 0 -2.434 0 -3.101∗∗ 1 -3.752∗∗ 1
GRE -2.894∗ 4 -2.842 4 -3.849∗∗∗ 1 -3.814∗∗ 1
ICE -0.957 0 -1.510 0 -2.722∗ 0 -2.737 0
IRE -0.742 0 -2.422 1 -2.674∗ 0 -2.651 0
ITA -2.463 1 -2.390 1 -4.073∗∗∗ 0 -4.652∗∗∗ 1
LX -2.457 0 -3.368∗ 0 -2.292 1 -2.205 1
NET -2.125 0 -3.307∗ 0 -3.321∗∗ 1 -3.913∗∗ 1
NOR -0.733 0 -1.750 0 -2.476 0 -2.446 0
POR -2.436 1 -2.478 1 -2.804∗ 0 -2.823 0
SWE 0.236 0 -1.291 0 -3.686∗∗∗ 1 -3.649∗∗ 1
SWI -1.482 0 -2.855 0 -4.033∗∗∗ 1 -5.141∗∗∗ 1
TK -2.736∗ 1 -1.587 1 -3.156∗∗ 1 -3.598∗∗ 1
UK -2.065 0 -1.358 1 -3.017∗∗ 1 -3.669∗∗ 1
IPS-
Test -0.36076 -0.84187 -8.3439∗∗∗ -7.216∗∗∗
**, *, * denote the rejection of the H0 of a unit root at the 1%, 5%, and
10% significance level, respectively.– Critical values of the ADF-test for the
the rejection of the H0-hypothesis of a unit-root are -3.70, -2.98 and -2.62 at
the 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively, in the regressions with-
out trend, and -4.32, -3.57 and -3.22 at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level,
respectively, in the regressions with deterministic trend (at 32 observations).–
Critical values of the IPS test for rejection of the H0 of a unit root are -2.32,
-1.64, -1.28 at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively.
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Table 3: Unit-root test results (imit, ln(wft/wit))
imit ln(wft/wit)
without trend with trend without trend with trend
test- test- test- test-
statistic lags statistic lags statistic lags statistic lags
AUS -1.875 2 -5.249∗∗∗ 1 -2.984∗∗ 0 -3.278∗ 0
BEL -3.413∗∗ 1 -3.477∗ 1 -2.057 0 0.080 5
DK -2.091 1 -2.429 1 -2.975∗∗ 1 -3.153 1
ESP -2.440 2 -1.954 2 -1.600 1 -0.861 1
FIN -2.342 1 -2.131 1 -2.903∗ 1 -3.362∗ 1
FRA -3.383∗∗ 1 -3.714∗∗ 1 -2.040 1 -1.305 0
GRE -1.793 2 -1.939 2 -2.361 0 -2.818 0
ICE -1.530 0 -1.549 0 -3.182∗∗ 1 -2.594 0
IRE -1.594 0 -1.254 0 -4.720 0 1.282 0
ITA -3.359∗∗ 2 -3.790∗∗ 0 -1.513 4 -1.513 4
LX -1.697 0 -1.412 0 1.266 0 -1.202 0
NET -2.035 2 -1.505 2 -1.414 0 -1.114 0
NOR -2.250 1 -2.202 1 -1.989 1 -3.171 1
POR -1.916 0 -1.961 0 -1.647 0 -3.334∗ 1
SWE -1.815 1 -2.257 0 -2.007 0 -2.697 1
SWI -2.478 2 -1.307 2 -1.167 0 -3.430∗ 3
TK -1.626 0 -3.485∗∗ 1 -2.239 0 -2.531 0
UK -3.270∗∗ 1 -3.107 1 -3.338∗∗ 1 -2.123 1
IPS-
Test -3.611∗∗ -1.806∗∗ -0.619 0.406
**, *, * denote the rejection of the H0 of a unit root at the 1%, 5%, and
10% significance level, respectively.– Critical values of the ADF-test for the
the rejection of the H0-hypothesis of a unit-root are -3.70, -2.98 and -2.62 at
the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively, in the regressions with-
out trend, and -4.32, -3.57 and -3.22 at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level,
respectively, in the regressions with deterministic trend (at 32 observations).–
Critical values of the IPS-Test for rejection of the H0 of a unit-root are -2.32,
-1.64, -1.28 at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively.
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Table 4: Unit-root test results (ln (wit), ln (eit), ln(eft))
ln (wit) ln (eit) ln(eft)
without trend with trend without trend without trend
test- test- test- test-
statistic lags statistic lags statistic lags statistic lags
AUS -3.307∗∗ 0 -2.738 3 -1.812 2 -
BEL -1.819 0 -3.376∗ 4 -1.888 1 -
DK -0.872 0 -2.380 0 -1.921 1 -
ESP -0.611 1 -3.379∗ 1 -1.627 2 -
FIN -0.819 1 -2.993 1 -1.566 2 -
FRA -1.831 0 -2.946 2 -1.664 1 -
GRE -2.742∗ 0 -1.882 3 -1.338 1 -
ICE -3.538∗∗ 0 -2.856 1 -2.051 1 -
IRE 4.653 0 1.402 0 -1.319 1 -
ITA -1.399 0 -1.742 1 -1.339 1 -
LX 1.187 0 -1.223 0 -0.982 3 -
NET -1.041 0 -2.597 1 -1.788 1 -
NOR -2.131 1 -2.554 1 -1.814 1 -
POR 0.572 4 -5.090∗∗∗ 3 -1.795 4 -
SWE -1.061 0 -2.465 1 -2.240 1 -
SWI -1.318 0 -2.984 1 -1.051 1 -
TK -1.704 0 -2.409 0 -2.808 1 -
UK -0.755 0 -3.536∗ 1 -1.607 2 -
GER - - - -1.306 2
IPS-
Test 2.307 -1.129 -0.945 -
**, *, * denote the rejection of the H0 of a unit root at the 1%, 5%, and
10% significance level, respectively.– Critical values of the ADF-test for the
the rejection of the H0-hypothesis of a unit-root are -3.70, -2.98 and -2.62 at
the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively, in the regressions with-
out trend, and -4.32, -3.57 and -3.22 at the 1%-, 5%- and 10%-significance level,
respectively, in the regressions with deterministic trend (at 32 observations).–
Critical values of the IPS-Test for rejection of the H0 of a unit-root are -2.32,
-1.64, -1.28 at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively.
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Table 5: Cointegration test results
without trend with trend
test-statistic lags test-statistic lags
AUS -5.359∗∗∗ 0 -4.993∗∗∗ 0
BEL -3.084 4 -3.453 1
DK -2.653 1 -3.319 0
ESP -5.629∗∗∗ 3 -5.500∗∗∗ 3
FIN -3.853 1 -3.645 1
FRA -2.801 1 -3.083 0
GRE -3.380 4 -4.4906∗∗∗ 3
ICE -3.452 3 -3.964∗ 3
IRE -3.211 2 -2.476 1
ITA -2.640 2 -3.824 3
LX -4.302∗∗∗ 4 -4.112∗ 4
NET -3.543 0 -3.522 0
NOR -2.750 0 -3.378 3
POR -3.039 4 -3.163 1
SWE -2.430 0 -2.640 0
SWI -3.721 0 -5.003∗∗∗ 1
TK -2.737 1 -2.996 2
UK -3.282 2 -3.529 2
Group t-statistics -1.588∗ -1.515∗
**, *, * denote the rejection of the H0 of a unit root in the residuals at the
1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively. In the regressions with
intercept, the critical values for the rejection of the H0 of a unit root are
-4.73, -4.11 and -3.83 at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respecti-
vely.– In the regressions with intercept and deterministic trend, the critical
values are -4.65, -4.16 and -3.84 at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level
respectively. See Hamilton (1994).– The group t-statistic has the asymptotic
standard normal distribution. The one-sided critical values for the rejection
of the H0 of a unit root in the residuals are -2.63, -1.64 and -1.28 at the 1%,
5%, and 10% significance level, respectively.
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Table 6: Estimation results
FE1 FGLS FGLS
(HET)2 (HET+COR)3
coeff. t-stat. coeff. t-stat. coeff. t-stat.
si,t−1 -0.150 ∗∗∗ -6.06 -0.126 ∗∗∗ -8.66 -0.143 ∗∗∗ -20.78
ln(wf/wi)t−1 0.087 ∗∗ 2.21 0.042 ∗ 1.92 0.084 ∗∗∗ 5.32
ln(wi)t−1 0.104 ∗∗∗ 3.57 0.056 ∗∗∗ 3.40 0.099 ∗∗∗ 6.43
ln(ef )t−1 0.733 ∗∗∗ 3.36 0.342 ∗∗∗ 3.65 0.613 ∗∗∗ 7.03
ln(ei)t−1 -0.163 ∗ -1.95 -0.106 ∗∗ -2.31 -0.131 ∗∗∗ -11.77
∆ ln(wf/wi)t 0.102 ∗∗ 2.33 0.037 0.33 0.120 1.11
∆ ln(wi)t 0.358 ∗∗∗ 2.99 0.184 1.57 0.282 ∗∗ 2.61
∆ ln(ef )t 0.851 ∗∗∗ 3.22 0.408 ∗ 1.83 0.548 ∗∗ 2.62
∆ ln(ei)t -0.225 -0.97 -0.164 -1.37 -0.163 ∗∗∗ -5.70
∆ si,t−1 0.411 ∗∗∗ 4.75 0.302 ∗∗∗ 7.89 0.410 ∗∗∗ 19.03
GUEST it 0.098 ∗∗∗ 6.27 0.105 ∗∗∗ 5.69 0.109 ∗∗∗ 11.64
FREE it 0.008 0.91 0.000 0.07 0.006 ∗∗∗ 3.69
DIKT it 0.062 ∗∗ 2.01 0.012 0.77 0.048 ∗∗∗ 5.91
STAT (1972) -0.112 ∗∗∗ -2.97 -0.048 ∗∗∗ -7.56 -0.101 ∗∗∗ -15.86
STAT (1987) -0.083 ∗∗∗ -3.77 -0.048 ∗∗∗ -7.79 -0.082 ∗∗∗ -13.59
adjusted R2 0.61 - -
Log-Likelihood - 1280 1661
1) Fixed Effects (within) regression. The F (17,543) statistic for the H0 that all
µi = 0is 9.80∗∗∗.– 2) Feasible Generalised Least Squared (FGLS) regression with
country dummies. The robust estimation of the covariance matrix allows for group-
wise heteroscedasticity in the disturbances. The χ2(17) statistic for the LR test
of the heteroscedastic vs. the homoscedastic model is 761.04∗∗∗.– 3) FGLS
regression with country dummies. The robust estimation of the covariance matrix
allows for groupwise heteroscedasticity in the disturbances and correlation across
groups. The χ2(33) statistic for the LR test of the heteroscedastic and
correlated vs. the heteroscedastic model is 762.58∗∗∗.
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